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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1995 
 ___________ 
 
 OUSMANE DOUMBIA, 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A088-551-849) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 






PER CURIAM.  
 Ousmane Doumbia, a citizen of the Ivory Coast, petitions for review of a 
final order of removal.  We will deny the petition for review. 
 Doumbia entered the United States without authorization, and he was 
served with a Notice to Appear in November 2006.  The Department of Homeland 
Security charged Doumbia with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the 
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled.  Doumbia conceded removability 
but filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) relief.  Doumbia claimed that he was persecuted in the Ivory Coast, and 
fears future persecution, due to his membership in the RDR, a political party, and his 
Dioula ethnicity. 
 After an evidentiary hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief to 
Doumbia.  The IJ first rejected Doumbia’s asylum claim on the ground that he had not 
filed his asylum application within one year of arriving in the United States, as required 
by section 208(a)(2)(B).  The IJ then determined that Doumbia lacked credibility and thus 
denied withholding of removal.  Among other things, the IJ observed that Doumbia had 
provided inconsistent accounts of the circumstances surrounding his alleged escape from 
detention and the punishment he suffered while detained.  The IJ also denied Doumbia’s 
request for relief under the CAT because Doumbia had failed to show that it was more 
likely than not that he would be tortured by the government if he returned to the Ivory 
Coast. 
 Doumbia sought review with the BIA, which dismissed his appeal.  The 
BIA concluded that “the serious inconsistencies found in the respondent’s testimony 
support[] the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding.”  Given the adverse 
credibility determination, the BIA held that Doumbia failed to carry his burden of proof 
for withholding of removal.  The BIA also noted that the IJ had properly performed an 
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independent evaluation of Doumbia’s CAT claim, and held that Doumbia had provided 
no basis for it to disturb the IJ’s conclusion that the claim lacked merit.  Doumbia timely 
filed a petition for review in this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under section 242 to review final orders of removal 
issued by the BIA.  However, as Doumbia acknowledges, we lack jurisdiction to review 
the agency’s determination that his asylum petition was untimely.  See Issiaka v. Att’y 
Gen., 569 F.3d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2009).  Therefore, we review only the BIA’s denial of 
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. 
 Where, as here, the BIA has based its decision on the IJ’s adverse 
credibility analysis, we may review the opinions of both the BIA and the IJ.  Thu v. Att’y 
Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review agency factual determinations, 
including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, 
treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  INA § 242(b)(4)(B).  Although adverse credibility 
determinations cannot be based on speculation or conjecture, “such a finding will be 
afforded substantial deference where it is grounded in evidence in the record and where 
the IJ provides specific, cogent reasons for her determination.”  Adbulrahaman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Because Doumbia filed his asylum application after May 11, 2005, the 
provisions of the REAL ID Act governing credibility determinations apply.  See Chukwu 
v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Prior to the implementation of the 
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REAL ID Act, minor omissions or inconsistencies that did not go to the heart of an 
asylum applicant’s claim were insufficient to support adverse credibility determinations.  
See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under the REAL ID Act, 
meanwhile, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on any inconsistencies, 
without regard to whether they relate to the heart of the alien’s claim.  INA § 
208(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also § 241(b)(3)(C) (providing that same standards apply to 
withholding-of-removal claims).  We have not applied the REAL ID Act standard in a 
precedential opinion.  Here, as the BIA noted, the inconsistencies that it found relate to 
the heart of Doumbia’s claims for relief, and would thus support an adverse credibility 
determination even under the pre-REAL ID Act standard.  Accordingly, we need not 
consider here whether 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) is consistent with due process.   
 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision to 
reject Doumbia’s credibility.  In an affidavit he provided in support of his asylum 
application, he provided the following account of his experiences:  The police in the 
Ivory Coast detained him, and during the detention, his captors struck him with a club.  
On the seventh day of his detention, the guards shot and killed four prisoners in his 




prison doors, allowing Doumbia to escape.
1
  At the start of the hearing before the IJ, 
Doumbia testified that this statement was complete and accurate.  However, at the 
hearing, he gave a much different account of his detention.  He claimed that while 
imprisoned, he was stabbed in the foot with a knife, which pierced all the way to the 
bone.  On the sixth day of his detention, the guards told him that the next day, they would 
kill all of the prisoners.  Doumbia thus decided to escape.  His prison door was not locked 
and there was no security, so he was able simply to let himself out and leave the prison.  
Thus, he provided inconsistent explanations of both what he experienced while detained 
and how he ultimately escaped detention.   
 Doumbia’s alleged detention is central to his claim that he was persecuted 
in the Ivory Coast, and the fact that he gave vastly different accounts of how it transpired 
supports the adverse credibility determination.  See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 
249 (3d Cir. 2003).  The record also supports the additional inconsistencies that the BIA 
and IJ identified:  the inconsistency between his testimony that he had been stabbed in the 
foot and the doctor’s statement he provided to support his claim, which said that 
Doumbia reported sustaining the injury through being tied up; as well as Doumbia’s 
varying explanations at the hearing for why he had not presented any materials 
supporting his claim.   
                                                 
1
  This affidavit actually represented Doumbia’s second effort to tell his story.  He 
initially submitted a bare-boned statement that described his detention in much more 
innocuous terms.  Because he updated the statement before the hearing, the IJ did not 




 Doumbia argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he was not credible 
because, while there were admittedly “some inconsistencies” between his statement and 
his testimony, those were caused by a language barrier.  Contrary to this argument, 
however, Doumbia testified that his affidavit had been explained to him in his native 
language.  The BIA’s conclusion that Doumbia did not provide an adequate explanation 
for the significant problems with his evidence is supported by substantial evidence.  
Because Doumbia failed to provide credible testimony in support of his withholding-of-
removal claim, he was not entitled to relief, and we will deny his petition for review on 
this claim.  See Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Doumbia also argues that the agency wrongly denied his CAT claim solely 
on the adverse credibility finding, rather than conducting the independent analysis that 
our case law requires.  We disagree.  As the BIA accurately explained, “the Immigration 
Judge provided an independent analysis of his request for protection under the CAT, 
which included a review of the relevant background information.”  We likewise conclude 
that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the materials Doumbia 
submitted do not show that he is “more likely than not” to be tortured if returned to the 
Ivory Coast.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see also Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 478 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (explaining that “reports of generalized brutality within a country” are not 
enough to qualify for relief under the CAT). 
  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
